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Narcotics and the Arab World

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A Research Paper

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Narcotics and the Arab World

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A Research Paper

This paper was prepared by [redacted]
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis,

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[redacted]
[redacted] It was
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations, [redacted]

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Comments and queries are welcome and may be
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**Narcotics and the
Arab World**

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Summary*Information available
as of 3 November 1986
was used in this report.*

Arab leaders are increasingly willing to undertake antinarcotics campaigns because:

- Drug abuse in Arab countries is rising. Drug use—opium, hashish, and qat—is a time-honored tradition in many Arab societies, but current abuse exceeds socially tolerated limits, particularly among urban youth.
- Drug trafficking finances many dissident and opposition groups, such as Lebanon's confessional militias.
- There is concern by some leaders about the negative effect that diversion of money to drug markets has on their economies.
- A strong antinarcotics stance may enhance their Islamic credentials.
- An antinarcotics campaign may be a useful instrument for solidifying relations with the United States, other Western states, and other Middle Eastern states.

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Narcotics trafficking will continue to be a large part of the economy of some Arab states—Lebanon in particular—and narcotics-related activities will employ large numbers of agricultural workers. A substantial portion of the illicit drug market in the United States will continue to be supplied by narcotics produced in or moved through the Arab world. Marijuana and hashish from the Arab states of the eastern Mediterranean constitute one-third or more of the US market share, and increasing amounts of Golden Crescent heroin will transit the region on its way to Europe and the United States.

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Antinarcotics efforts will be limited, however, by some of the same constraints that slowed Arab governments' involvement in drug enforcement in the first place:

- Many Arab cultures perceive drug abuse to be a Western or foreign problem.
- Arab leaders give higher priority to more pressing political and economic problems.
- Enforcement efforts encounter resistance from powerful tribal and other internal groups that depend on drug money.
- Corruption among government officials is endemic and deeply entrenched.

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Antinarcotics enforcement capabilities and interdiction efforts in the Arab world vary widely. Saudi Arabia and Egypt are far ahead of the rest of the region in devoting resources to antinarcotics programs. Saudi Arabia's

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interdiction program is bolstered by a sophisticated network of computers and automated reporting procedures. Cairo has declared a national war on narcotics and has experimented with modern rehabilitation programs for abusers. At the other extreme, Lebanon has not been able to address any aspect of its narcotics problem.

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Arab leaders will continue to place antinarcotics initiatives on the agenda of groups such as the Arab League and the Islamic Conference Organization, but no major regional agreements are likely soon. Direct or indirect involvement in narcotics production and trafficking by officials of some Arab states prevents a workable regional response to drug problems. Members of the Syrian military in Lebanon's Al Bika' (Bekaa Valley), for example, are likely to continue to extort large kickbacks from drug growers and traffickers in zones under Syrian military control.

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Arab states are likely to increase their requests for Western—specifically US—help in improving their antinarcotics programs. US involvement in Arab antinarcotics programs is less likely to produce a violent anti-American reaction than it has in South America. Operations against a major trafficker or programs that threaten to expose high-level involvement in narcotics, however, will rouse local sensitivities and possibly official resistance.

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
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


Figure 1. North Yemeni shopkeeper chewing qat and smoking tobacco

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Narcotics and the Arab World

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A Hub of International Drug Traffic

In the international drug-trafficking network, the Arab states link the producing regions of the Golden Crescent—Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan—to the lucrative narcotics markets of the West. More than half of the heroin consumed in the United States in the last five years was produced in the Golden Crescent, according to information from the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). According to these same reports, an increasing proportion of that heroin passes through the Middle East, either for further processing or to make connections to the organized crime families involved in running drugs into North America. Lebanon is the source of more than one-third of the 150 tons of hashish entering the

United States annually. Morocco is the main source of hashish entering Europe. The Arab world has had little connection with the production or trafficking of cocaine, according to DEA reports, although recent drug seizures indicate a rise in cocaine moving through the Middle East for distribution in Western Europe.

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Many tribal and ethnic groups have established intricate trade and cultural relationships that transcend contemporary political boundaries. These relationships have long been used to support networks for the smuggling of all sorts of contraband. US Embassy reporting from Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco over

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Hashish: A Bekaa Bestseller

Marijuana (Cannabis sativa and Cannabis indica) grows wild throughout much of the tropic and temperate regions of the world. Its active chemical elements are equally effective eaten or smoked. Most US users of cannabis prefer it in the form of common marijuana, the dried and crumbled leaves and flowers of the adult plant. The most popular—and most potent and most expensive—form of marijuana available in the US market comes from carefully tended unpollinated female plants bred especially for their high psychoactive chemical content. []

Middle Eastern and West European users traditionally prefer marijuana that has been processed further into either hashish or hashish oil. Hashish is the drug-rich resinous secretion of the cannabis plant and is produced throughout the Middle East using a variety of techniques. Speaking to an Egyptian journalist in mid-1986, a Lebanese farmer in the Bekaa Valley described the process used in his village to process the cannabis crop into more marketable hashish. The mature plants are harvested at the end of the growing season, usually in late September. The plants are spread to dry for a few days and then stored inside for nearly two months. At that point, they are passed through a mechanical chopper, dried in the sun for more than a week, and then run through a series of rollers, sieves, and presses to separate the hashish from the stems and woody material. The hashish is then sorted, graded, and packed for export. []

Hashish oil is a dark, tarry exudate made by extracting the psychoactive chemicals from the dried cannabis plant through repeated distillation. It is popular in Western Europe, where it is applied to tobacco cigarettes. A drop of the liquid is roughly equivalent in psychoactive effect to a single "joint" of common marijuana. []

the last several years, for instance, describes drug smuggling activities of such networks in the Maghreb. The governments of these countries have traditionally tolerated the hashish trade largely because the business is in the hands of important tribal chiefs and has rarely disturbed the central government. Farmers in the Rif region of northern Morocco, according to US diplomatic sources, have no economic alternative to their cultivation of marijuana and marketing of hashish. In Tunisia and Algeria, where little hashish is grown, drug smuggling is an important part of tribal economic activity, according to US diplomatic reporting. []

Domestic Drug Abuse

Concern about domestic drug abuse is growing among many Arab leaders. According to US diplomatic reporting, leaders in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan have expressed fear that Arab youth are as susceptible to narcotics as are Western adolescents. In discussions with these leaders, US officials note that Arab administrators responsible for national antinarcotics programs report that drug abuse is a particular problem among the educated, urbanized elite. We believe the comments of Egyptian antinarcotics officials to visiting US officials in early 1986 echo the growing perception throughout much of the Arab world that narcotics abuse is a major problem. The Egyptian officials said Cairo was aware that drugs debilitated the country's youth, hindered national economic and political development, and were a problem that could only be solved by increased international cooperation and a strong domestic antiabuse program. []

Statistics for domestic drug abuse in Arab countries are not reliable. []

[]

Annual narcotics surveys prepared by US missions in Arab states that collect drug abuse statistics, however, report an overall rise. Another indicator that abuse levels are rising is the increased number of requests from Arab states for US antinarcotics program assistance received during 1985 and 1986. During that

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Figure 3. Drying marijuana in Morocco




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period, according to US drug officials, domestic drug abuse treatment programs in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and other Arab states have grown.


Centers for the production or trafficking of narcotics have become particularly notorious areas of drug abuse.

- Alexandria, Egypt, is both a growing transshipment point for drugs and the Egyptian city with the highest drug abuse rate, according to US and Egyptian officials.
- Although hashish has been grown for decades in Lebanon's Al Biqa' (Bekaa Valley), local press reports indicate that domestic abuse by the Bekaa's residents has become a problem since the late 1970s, when the drug industry supplanted most of the region's legitimate agriculture.
- Saudi authorities acknowledge that increasing amounts of the narcotics shipped into their country are consumed not by the country's large foreign worker population but by Saudi citizens. Saudi users prefer sophisticated processed amphetamines and heroin, according to US advisers to the Saudi customs service.

Corruption a Factor



Major drug arrests in several Arab states have revealed to Arab leaders that profits from narcotics trafficking subvert officials in positions of trust.



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
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Figure 4
Narcotics Trafficking Routes Through the Arab World



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Figure 5. South Asian workers throughout the Middle East have spread the use of opium and its derivatives. [redacted]

Other Barriers to Antinarcotics Programs

Efforts to devise regional antinarcotics programs are further hampered by the direct or indirect involvement of some Arab government officials and groups in the drug business. We believe that such involvement prevents other Arab states from achieving the level of consensus necessary to reduce trafficking through the region. [redacted]

Some members of the Syrian military forces in Lebanon are deeply involved in lucrative drug growing and production activities in the Bekaa Valley, according to

DEA reports. Although we do not believe these Syrian military personnel are pursuing a formal government policy when they extort payoffs from the Lebanese growers and traffickers passing through their zones, we believe encouraging the Bekaa's drug business serves Syrian interests by:

- Giving Damascus one more lever with which to manipulate political and economic activity in the region.
- Giving an added monetary reward to Syrian troops in the area—an incentive that Damascus frequently uses to maintain their loyalty. [redacted]

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We believe the Syrian Government is resistant to international antinarcotics cooperation both because it places a low priority on drug issues and because it considers the lucrative drug kickbacks earned by Syrian officials in Lebanon to be an important perquisite of military service. The Syrian Government received US drug officials on several occasions in 1984 and 1985 to discuss areas of collaboration. The Syrians, however, failed to follow through on agreed programs and rebuffed later efforts to reopen communication, according to US Embassy and DEA reports. Damascus also does not welcome international antinarcotics cooperation, such as through Interpol or the UN Fund for Drug Abuse Control, according to the same reports. [redacted]

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We believe that Syrian diplomats exploit their positions for personal gain by trafficking in drugs. According to Western press accounts, Spain expelled two Syrian diplomats in 1985 for abusing their diplomatic privileges by smuggling heroin into Spain. The Italian Government in 1986 asked two Syrian diplomats to leave the country after it discovered they were using their diplomatic immunity to bring large amounts of narcotics into Italy in their personal vehicles, according to the Italian press. [redacted]

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Some members of Palestinian organizations apparently use their widespread connections and organizational ties to make profitable contacts in international narcotics networks, [redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted] Such exploitation of Middle Eastern drug-trafficking rings is apparently done without the knowledge of PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat. The DEA received a series of reports during 1986 linking members of the PLO to cocaine trafficking rings in Bolivia, run by Bolivians of Palestinian descent. According to these reports, PLO officials annually move significant amounts of cocaine and cocaine base to the Middle East for further processing and distribution, apparently without the involvement or knowledge of senior PLO leaders. We do not know if these Palestinians are working for their own benefit or sharing the proceeds with their parent organization. [redacted]

Dissident Groups Profit From Drugs

Dissident groups in the Arab world are attracted to the drug business for quick money. Lebanese confessional militias earn valuable income from taxing drug business conducted in areas under their control, even though group members may not be directly involved in the growing, production, or trafficking of illicit narcotics. [redacted]

[redacted] we also believe that members of Iraqi Kurdish insurgent groups rely in part on narcotics funds. [redacted]

In our judgment, such groups can often build on existing connections in the international arms gray market to traffic in narcotics as well. We agree with academic experts that insurgent groups are more likely than terrorist factions to become connected with narcotics trafficking because of the organizational infrastructure and relatively long-term political relationships that are required. [redacted]

Stronger Government Enforcement

The growing realization by Arab officials that uncontrolled drug trafficking funds dissident groups and adds to domestic narcotics abuse—thereby taking a heavy toll on human and financial resources—has led

some Arab states to intensify their efforts to interdict illegal narcotics. Egypt, for example, has begun one of the Arab world's most aggressive antinarcotics programs, using a multifaceted approach to attack grower-producer-trafficker networks, according to US Embassy reporting from Cairo. In October 1985, Egypt began a well-publicized national antinarcotics campaign involving the national media and the major political opposition groups. In late spring 1986, President Mubarak announced plans for a national narcotics coordination council to streamline the antidrug bureaucracy and took other steps to toughen Egyptian antinarcotics laws. For the first time, drug offenders—including those arrested with minimal amounts of hashish and marijuana—faced long imprisonment and even the death penalty. By the summer of 1986, Egypt had instituted US-style asset seizure laws to support the new antinarcotics initiatives. [redacted]

Antinarcotics enforcement capabilities of Arab states vary widely. US advisers to the Saudi Customs Service consider that, at one extreme, Saudi Arabia has the most sophisticated and thorough antinarcotics effort in the Arab world. With the direct support of King Fahd and under the overall management of Minister of Interior Prince Nayif, Riyadh uses a nationwide network of computers and advanced Western technology to help spot drugs entering the kingdom. The Saudis have stringent criminal laws to punish narcotics traffickers. In contrast, many smaller Arab states—Morocco and Tunisia, for example—give responsibility for antinarcotics efforts to local police. [redacted]

Arab narcotics interdiction efforts are uneven. We believe that the technologically advanced Saudi program has been the most successful. The Saudis interdict about 10 percent of the illicit narcotics entering or transiting the country—approximately the same as the estimated US rate—according to Riyadh's estimates. Syria and Lebanon, in our judgment, have done the least to interdict drugs. Damascus makes virtually no effort to control international narcotics trafficking through its ports and helps maintain the patronage networks that underlie the cultivation and production of hashish and heroin in Lebanon's Bekaa

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Figure 6. Yemeni Mafraj—qat party



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Valley. Even if the Gemayel government in Lebanon had the political will to try to stop the drug trade, it lacks the power to control the drug-related activities of militias and dissident groups in the country. []

In some Arab countries—notably Iraq—political and military concerns overshadow antinarcotics efforts. According to the US Embassy in Baghdad, Iraq's security and military forces are so preoccupied by the war with Iran that little attention is paid to antidrug operations. []

An Islamic Response

The *hadith*, the exegetical works drawn from the Koran, clearly proscribes the use of alcohol for believing Muslims. Many Islamic scholars have interpreted this ban to apply to other intoxicants or psychoactive substances, including opium, hashish, qat, and some modern medicines, according to Arab writers. Rarely, however, is the use of drugs so clearly proscribed as the use of alcohol. []

Antidrug—and antialcohol—sentiments have been part of many Arab religious and reform movements, according to academic experts, although few of these

movements have had much impact outside a single country. Islamic leaders in several Arab countries have called for the imposition of strict Islamic law in response to perceived un-Islamic practices such as the use of alcohol and drugs. According to US Embassy reports, Jordan has a relatively low level of domestic drug abuse, in part because Muslim leaders have actively campaigned against the un-Islamic nature of drug abuse. Kuwait expanded a popular program of narcotics awareness talks staged in major mosques in 1985 and 1986, according to US diplomatic reporting. []

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Islamic law has failed to provide an adequate basis for multinational Arab antinarcotic programs because of differing interpretations of how the law applies to society's problems. Specifically, the utility of Islam as a basis for cooperative action in the Arab world is weakened by:

- The overidentification of each legal system with specific countries.
- The inability of Islamic legal systems to adapt to contemporary international legal practices.

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Yemen's Qat: A Social Institution

The Arab world is the sole producer and consumer of a unique drug, qat. Qat (Catha edulis Forssk.) is a small shrub that produces a mildly stimulating effect when its leaves are chewed. The strength of the chemically active substance in the plant deteriorates within a few hours of picking, making transport and use impossible outside the areas where it is cultivated. []

Although both the use and cultivation of qat are widespread in North and South Yemen, the southern part of the Arabian Peninsula, and portions of Djibouti and coastal Somalia, officials make little attempt to control the substance. According to Western and Saudi scholars, Muslim leaders are unsure whether qat is proscribed under Islamic law or whether, like tobacco, there is no authoritative guidance. Both Arab and Western commentators agree that the use of qat has become a feature of Yemeni society. [] almost all large business and social transactions take place during the afternoon qat party. The makeup of these qat groups, the social standing of the host and the guests, and the quality of qat offered to the participants are all

important symbols of social rank and position. Learning the social codes and mores that ensure acceptance and approval during qat sessions is essential to a Yemeni's sense of self and his success in life.

Diplomatic reporting from Sanaa notes, however, that, whatever the imams might say about the morality of chewing qat, the government is increasingly concerned about the plant's debilitating economic effect on the nation. Scholars have noted that until the last decade qat consumption was limited by its high price and commonly taken only in moderation.

[] the earnings of Yemenis working abroad now subsidize their family's qat consumption. Several recent academic studies have illustrated the incompatibility between governmental efforts to modernize Yemeni society and the national predilection for qat. We believe that qat will remain a problem unique to the areas of its cultivation and will have little effect on the Arab world's overall involvement with international drug trafficking. []

- The identification—in some instances—of efforts to institute Islamic law with Islamic fundamentalist movements.¹ []

Cooperative Efforts Falter

As awareness of drug problems has risen in the Arab world, efforts to coordinate a regional response have begun. Moderate members of the Arab League—Saudi Arabia in particular—have attempted several times to design a unified Arab antinarcotics statute that all members could accept. According to US diplomatic reporting from Casablanca, Arab League interior ministers approved a model antinarcotics law in February 1986 but referred the question of how to

implement the legislation to a committee for further study. The model and its guidelines appeared several times on Arab League agendas during 1986, but there has been no progress toward implementation, according to US diplomatic reporting. []

The moderate Arab states that dominate the Islamic Conference Organization have also pushed for a unified antinarcotics position based on Islamic law that would identify drugs as a threat to Islam and therefore a suitable subject for cooperation. The Saudis, again, have been the most active advocates. The size of the organization—41 Islamic states from around the world—inhibits consensus building. Narcotics trafficking pales for most members beside such issues as Jerusalem, the Palestinians, and the Arab-Israeli conflict, according to US Embassy reporting from Riyadh. []

¹ Arab civil legal systems also differ widely and hamper regional collaborative antinarcotics efforts. Most Arab law grows directly from the region's colonial legacy. British law underlies part of the structure of Egyptian legal usage, and French Napoleonic law is the basis for Tunisian, Lebanese, and other regional systems. []

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Iran: An Islamic Response to the Narcotics Problem

Although not an Arab state, Iran plays an important role in the Middle East's drug story. According to recent estimates of Iran's opium poppy crop by US officials, the country continues to grow a significant amount of opium, much of which is exported to lucrative Western markets through the processing and trafficking centers of the Middle East. [redacted]

Iran's radical Islamic government, after initially ignoring the narcotics problem, tried but failed to apply Islamic fundamentalist principles to the problem of controlling drug abuse. Even on the basis of Tehran's official—and conservative—estimates for domestic abuse, we estimate that Iran has an opiate abuser rate proportionally more than 12 times that of the United States. [redacted]

Although the government has instituted severe punishments for drug trafficking—including the death penalty—Iran has been unable to break the insurgent-trafficker networks that move opium, heroin, and hashish. According to DEA and US diplomatic reports, Baluch separatist and Afghan refugee groups dominate the transshipments of opium from Afghanistan and Pakistan and use the income to buy weapons. Narcotics also move through Kurdish rebel territory along the western border of Iran on its way to Western markets. [redacted]

Iran's Arab neighbors are probably aware of the Iranian role in narcotics trafficking but are largely powerless to stop it. The Iran-Iraq war and Tehran's support of Lebanese Shia groups will probably preclude regional antinarcotics cooperation with Iran for the foreseeable future. [redacted]

Efforts to create a workable regional antinarcotics program are hamstrung by competing political alignments among Arab states and the lack of a shared sense of commitment to resolving the drug problem. For example, [redacted]

[redacted] to the Arab League's narcotics conference in August 1986 for his country's active support of Lebanon's drug industry. The meeting ended without achieving agreement on future antidrug actions. [redacted]

Attempts by some Arab states to exert leadership in antinarcotics efforts have been resented by other governments. Riyadh, for example, attempted several times in 1985 and 1986 to persuade the smaller members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to cooperate in joint customs and antinarcotics training programs. Other GCC members initially rebuffed the effort as a threat to their sovereignty, according to US diplomats serving in the Gulf. The smaller members of the GCC, however, admit their satisfaction with the training and support the idea of increased regional antinarcotics cooperation, [redacted]

[redacted] The smaller GCC members met several times in late 1986 without Saudi representation to design mutual assistance antinarcotics programs, in part, we believe, to demonstrate their independence from Riyadh. [redacted]

Prospects

In our judgment, rising domestic drug abuse and continued international narcotics trafficking through the region will encourage Arab states to explore antinarcotics programs further. We anticipate that many states in the region will experiment with a range of drug treatment programs, including increasing hospital facilities, private treatment centers, further antinarcotics educational efforts, and more stringent punishments for drug abuse. Interdiction efforts, particularly at airports, will remain an important element of all Arab antidrug programs, but they are not likely to make a significant reduction in the overall level of

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Israel: A Regional Nonparticipant

According to diplomatic and press reports, the level of drug abuse in Israel is rising. Officials in Tel Aviv have become concerned in the last three years that increasing drug smuggling by Israelis is making hashish and heroin more available to young people. Enforcement efforts have focused on reducing the trafficking across Israel's borders and through its international airports, [redacted]

[redacted] The Israeli press carried stories in the summer of 1986 about numerous large drug seizures of heroin and hashish from Lebanon. In July 1986, Israel Defense Forces in the Gaza Strip arrested more than 40 members of one smuggling syndicate that had in its possession more than \$1.5 million worth of heroin and Lebanese hashish that was being smuggled into Israel. In June 1986, according to the Israeli press, police in Jerusalem broke up a 35-member drug smuggling ring that had connections in Palestinian refugee camps in the region. [redacted]

The Israeli Government maintains good working relations with the DEA, Interpol, and UN bodies involved in international antinarcotics efforts. [redacted]

illicit drugs trafficked through the region. Corruption and competing national priorities will remain strong deterrents to the implementation of adequate antinarcotics efforts. [redacted]

We believe the narcotics challenge to Arab states will grow because:

- The money to be made in drug trafficking will be an increasingly attractive source of funds to dissident groups such as the Lebanese militias and the Iraqi Kurds.
- The lack of a responsible antidrug authority in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley assures that large amounts of narcotics will continue to be grown and processed there.
- The organized West European crime networks that support the movement of illicit drugs out of the Middle East are likely to grow more extensive, according to academic experts.

According to DEA seizure data [redacted] large amounts of hashish produced in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley pass through Israel to wholesale distributors in Egypt. Tel Aviv is aware that a small number of Israeli army personnel assigned in southern Lebanon are acting as couriers for hashish and heroin moving into and through Israel, according to articles in the Israeli press. Of greater security concern to both the Israeli and Egyptian Governments, however, are the disturbing accounts that the income earned from this traffic supports dissident groups in both countries. [redacted]

- Local corruption shows no sign of abating and will remain an important part of the area's drug-trafficking networks. [redacted]

Arab efforts to cooperate against the drug threat will be hamstrung by conflicting views on the nature of the problem and political rivalries. In our view, Arab leaders will become increasingly concerned that the illegal drug traffic could threaten economic development and national security. Other regional issues, however, such as the Arab-Israeli dispute, the Iran-Iraq war, and the regional recession, will hamper attempts to focus on the problem. [redacted]

We believe the Arab League and the Islamic Conference Organization will continue to discuss antinarcotics cooperation, but we doubt that major progress

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will occur. Narcotics cooperation will continue to be overshadowed by more politically contentious and emotion-laden issues. Moreover, as long as Egypt is suspended from the Arab League, regional cooperation will be weakened because much hashish and heroin trafficking takes place in Egypt. [REDACTED]

noted serious threats against several of its officers in the area, and we cannot rule out the possibility of retaliation against US officials or interests. [REDACTED]

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It is difficult for many Arab states to overcome mutual suspicion and share the range of antinarcotics intelligence that would be necessary to create a significant regional approach to the problem. US Embassy reporting from Baghdad, for example, notes that the Iraqis' preoccupation with their war with Iran probably would lead them to consider information on drug matters to be related to national security, and thus a state secret. Moderate Arab states, however, are likely to continue to share selected antinarcotics intelligence with international drug enforcement efforts, such as those of Interpol. [REDACTED]

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We expect some Arab states to improve their antinarcotics programs. Riyadh and Cairo so far have shown the most awareness of the social and political dangers of allowing domestic drug abuse and trafficking to get out of hand. Other Arab states—particularly the more moderate regimes such as Jordan and the Gulf states—appear ready to institute similar national programs. On the basis of their earlier overtures to the West, we believe these governments will turn to outside assistance from Interpol, the UN agencies involved in antinarcotics work, and Western countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and West Germany. [REDACTED]

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Implications for the United States

In our judgment, Arab states interested in improving their antidrug capabilities will look to the United States and other Western countries for specific enhancements to their existing programs:

- Legal advice, such as how to implement effective drug asset seizure laws.
- Technical assistance, such as sophisticated drug-sensing equipment and specialized training for police and customs officials. [REDACTED]

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Increased US participation in antinarcotics programs in the Arab world is less likely to produce a violent anti-American reaction than such activity often generates in South America. Nevertheless, DEA has

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